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ABSTRACT
Organizations with a large user base, such as Samsung and
Google, can potentially benefit from collecting and mining
users’ data. However, doing so raises privacy concerns, and
risks accidental privacy breaches with serious consequences.
Local differential privacy (LDP) techniques address this
problem by only collecting randomized answers from each
user, with guarantees of plausible deniability; meanwhile,
the aggregator can still build accurate models and predic-
tors by analyzing large amounts of such randomized data.
So far, existing LDP solutions either have severely restricted
functionality, or focus mainly on theoretical aspects such as
asymptotical bounds rather than practical usability and per-
formance. Motivated by this, we propose Harmony, a prac-
tical, accurate and efficient system for collecting and ana-
lyzing data from smart device users, while satisfying LDP.
Harmony applies to multi-dimensional data containing both
numerical and categorical attributes, and supports both ba-
sic statistics (e.g., mean and frequency estimates), and com-
plex machine learning tasks (e.g., linear regression, logistic
regression and SVM classification). Experiments using real
data confirm Harmony’s effectiveness.
1. INTRODUCTION
Smart devices connected to the Internet, including mo-
bile phones, wearables, home appliances, sensors and vehi-
cles, have become a part of everyday life in many parts of
the world. The data collected by these devices could be
an invaluable asset to hardware designers and application
developers. For instance, a smartphone maker with its own
customized UI such as Samsung TouchWiz could learn about
the usage patterns of the various UI features such as Multi
Window and One-Handed Mode, and focus on improving
the popular ones. However, privacy concerns remain a ma-
jor hurdle in collecting users’ data. For example, the user
may not want others to know her web browsing history, apps
installed and locations visited. Even if the user (reluctantly)
allows trusted organizations to collect her data, the posses-
sion of large amounts of sensitive personal data poses a ma-
jor security risk. Accidental leakage of such personal data,
which happened to AOL1, Netflix2 and Ashley Madison3,
led to serious consequences and substantial damage. So, or-
ganizations with a large user base commonly face a dilemma:
either they collect users’ personal data and become exposed
to the risk of privacy breaches, or they do not collect such
data and lose the opportunity of mining them.
Local differential privacy (LDP), which has been used in
Google’s Chrome browser [11], addresses the above dilemma.
The idea is to compute aggregates of users’ data without
collecting individuals precise personal information. Unlike
other models of differential privacy [8,9], which publish ran-
domized aggregates but still collect the exact sensitive data,
LDP avoids collecting exact personal information in the first
place, thus providing a stronger assurance to the users and
to the aggregator. Meanwhile, LDP satisfies the strong and
rigorous privacy guarantees of differential privacy, i.e., the
adversary cannot infer sensitive information of an individ-
ual with high confidence, regardless of the adversary’s back-
ground knowledge.
Google’s LDP solution in its Chrome browser, namely
Rappor [11], has rather limited functionalities. The core
of Rappor is a randomized response mechanism [20] for a
user to answer a yes/no question to the aggregator. A clas-
sic example is to collect statistics about a sensitive group
(e.g., communists in the US), in which the aggregator asks
each individual: “Are you a communist?” To answer this
question, each individual tosses a coin, gives the true an-
swer if it is a head, and a random yes/or answer otherwise.
Clearly, this randomized approach provides plausible deni-
ability to the individuals. Meanwhile, it is shown to satisfy
ǫ-differential privacy, and the strength of privacy protec-
tion (i.e., ǫ) can be controlled by using an unfair coin [11].
Based on the collected randomized answers, the aggrega-
tor estimates the percentage of users whose true answer is
“yes” (resp. “no”). Besides simple counting, a follow-up pa-
per [12] shows that Rappor can also compute other types of
statistics such as joint-distribution estimation and associa-
tion testing. However, three major limitations remain: first,
Rappor cannot compute aggregates on numeric attributes,
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AOL search data leak
2http://www.wired.com/2009/12/netflix-privacy-lawsuit/
3http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/27/opinions/yang-ashley-madison-hack/
e.g., the average running time of an app. Second, the accu-
racy of Rappor deteriorates quickly with increasing number
of attributes; as we show later in Section 3.2, to compute
aggregates on d independent attributes, the error of Rappor
grows linearly with d, which is sub-optimal [5, 7]. Third,
it is unclear whether/how Rappor can handle complex and
yet commonly used machine learning tasks, such as logistic
regression and SVM classification.
LDP has also drawn considerable interest from the theory
community. However, as we review in Section 6, their fo-
cus lies mostly in analyzing the asymptotical performance of
basic building blocks of LDP, rather than practical systems
and performance. In other words, the problem they study
is “what is the best that LDP can do”, rather than “how to
design a practical LDP solution”. Perhaps due to this rea-
son, as we show in Section 3.1, the state-of-the-art solution
(to our knowledge) for estimating mean values of multiple
attributes under LDP is buggy and requires a fix. Mean-
while, we are not aware of any systematic approach that
can perform common machine learning tasks under LDP on
a large data domain containing both numeric and categorical
attributes.
Motivated by this, we have been building Harmony, an
advanced data analytics tool that conforms to LDP require-
ments. Harmony supports a multitude of common data anal-
ysis tasks over an arbitrary number of numerical or categor-
ical attributes. Further, Harmony achieves both non-trivial
asymptotical error bounds and improved accuracy in prac-
tice, compared to the current state of the art. As a case
study, we show how Harmony can improve diagnostic in-
formation reporting in Samsung smartphones with strong
privacy guarantees, as follows.
1.1 Potential Use Case
Samsung currently collects mobile phone usage informa-
tion from users through a diagnostic tool bundled with the
Samsung Android OS4. The information collected include
the mobile phone’s settings (e.g., display settings, whether
or not the location functionality is turned on), memory and
battery usage, as well as other log data. The tool transmits
the data in an unperturbed format to Samsung, and the
transmission explicitly requires users’ consent. However, as
the collected information could potentially reveal sensitive
information, it is beneficial to enhance the tool with privacy
protection mechanisms, so as to provide rigorous privacy as-
surance to users.
Towards this end, local differential privacy is an attractive
approach due to its strong privacy guarantee, and its prac-
ticability that has been demonstrated in Rappor [11]. How-
ever, Rappor’s LDP mechanism focuses on collecting a single
categorical attribute, whereas the data collected by the Sam-
sung diagnostic tool include both numeric ones (e.g., battery
usage) and categorical ones (e.g., display settings). Fur-
thermore, Rappor does not support complex learning tasks
(e.g., regressions, SVM), whereas such tasks are important
for Samsung to build analytical models from the data, e.g.,
building an early symptom model to predict system errors
based on other measurements such as battery usage, mem-
ory usage, active applications, etc. This necessitates the
development of new data collection technique based on local
differential privacy.
4The tool is available in the system under“Settings> About
device > Report diagnostic info”.
Table 1: Notations
pdf(x) Probability density at x
〈a, b〉 A tuple of a and b
a||b A concatenation of a and b
Bern(p) A Bernoulli distribution with parameter p
log(x) Natural logarithm of x
Dom(f) Domain of function f
[d] Set of natural numbers {1, 2, . . . , d}
In the following, Section 2 provides the necessary back-
ground on LDP. Sections 3 presents the fundamental LDP
mechanisms in Harmony. Section 4 applies Harmony to com-
mon data analytics tasks based on empirical risk minimiza-
tion, including linear regression, logistic regression and SVM
classification. Section 5 contains an extensive set of exper-
iments. Section 6 reviews related work. Finally, Section 7
concludes with directions for future work.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In our setting, an aggregator (e.g., Samsung) collects data
from a set of users (e.g., smart device owners), and com-
putes statistical models of the collected data. The goal is
to maximize the accuracy of these statistical models, while
preserving the privacy of the users. Following the local dif-
ferential privacy model [2, 7, 11], we assume that the aggre-
gator already knows the identities (e.g., IP addresses) of the
users, but not their private data. Formally, let n be the
total number of users, and ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) denote the i-th
user. Each user ui’s private data is represented by a tuple ti,
which contains d attributes A1, A2, . . . , Ad. These attributes
can be either numerical or categorical. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that each numeric attribute has a domain
[−1, 1], and each categorical attribute with k distinct values
has a discrete domain {1, 2, . . . , k}.
To protect privacy, each user ui first perturbs her tuple ti
using a randomized perturbation function f . Then, she sends
the perturbed data f(ti) to the aggregator instead of her true
data record ti. The perturbation function determines the
privacy / utility tradeoff. As an extreme case, if f(ti) = ti
(i.e., no perturbation), the aggregator obtains perfect utility
since it computes the statistical models based on the exact
data; however, the privacy of the users is completely lost
as the aggregator receives their sensitive data. The other
extreme is that f simply outputs a random tuple regardless
of ti, which leads to the highest level of privacy and zero
utility, i.e., the aggregator learns nothing about the users’
data.
Given a privacy parameter ǫ > 0 that controls the privacy-
utility tradeoff, we require that f satisfies ǫ-local differential
privacy (ǫ-LDP) [11], defined as follows:
Definition 1 (ǫ-local differential privacy). A
randomized function f satisfies ǫ-local differential privacy if
and only if for any two input tuples t, t′ ∈ Dom(f) and for
any possible output t∗ of f , we have:
Pr[f(t) = t∗] ≤ eǫ × Pr[f(t′) = t∗].
Basically, local differential privacy is a special case of dif-
ferential privacy [9] where the random perturbation is per-
formed by the users, not by the aggregator. In other words,
the aggregator never possesses the exact private data of any
user. According to the above definition, the aggregator, who
receives the perturbed tuple t∗, cannot distinguish whether
the true tuple is t or another tuple t′ with high confidence
(controlled by parameter ǫ), regardless of the background
information of the aggregator. This provides plausible deni-
ability to the user. Note that in ǫ-LDP, since random per-
turbation is done at each user, it is possible to achieve per-
sonalized privacy protection by using different values of the
privacy parameter ǫ at different users, depending on their
respective privacy requirements. In this paper, we assume a
universal ǫ for the ease of presentation and analysis.
We aim to support the following types of analytics tasks
under ǫ-LDP:
1. Mean value and frequency estimation. These are two
basic types of statistics. For each numeric attribute
Aj , we aim to estimate the mean value of Aj over all
n users, 1
n
∑n
i=1 ti[Aj ]. For each categorical attribute
A′j , we aim to estimate the frequency of each possible
value of A′j , i.e., a histogram. Note that it is also pos-
sible to build such a histogram for a numeric attribute
with a finite number of possible values.
2. Empirical Risk Minimization. These are advanced
statistics commonly used in machine learning. Exam-
ples include linear regression, logistic regression, and
support vector machines (SVM) [3].
Unless otherwise specified, all expectations in this paper are
taken over the random choices made by the algorithms con-
sidered.
Remark. In practice, the tuple ti of a user may change
overtime (e.g., the phone usage information of a user would
change day by day); accordingly, the aggregator may want to
re-collect information from users after a certain time period
(e.g., one week). In that case, we aim to ensure that the col-
lection of each individual snapshot of ti satisfies ǫ-differential
privacy. One may argue that it is more desirable to ensure
that all collected snapshots jointly achieve ǫ-differential pri-
vacy, but to our knowledge, this is an open problem when
the number of snapshots to be collected can be arbitrarily
large.
3. ESTIMATING MEANS AND FREQUEN-
CIES
This section investigates the design of the perturbation
function f to support accurate estimation of mean values
(resp. frequencies) of numeric (resp. categorical) attributes.
For ease of exposition, Section 3.1 considers the case when
all attributes A1, A2, . . . , Ad in the users’ data have a nu-
meric domain [−1, 1]; after that, Section 3.2 extends our
discussions to the case when both numeric and categorical
attributes are present.
3.1 Estimating Mean Values for Numeric At-
tributes
Given a tuple ti containing d numeric attributes, a naive
design of the perturbation function f is to apply the Laplace
Mechanism [8]. In particular, let t∗i = f(ti) be the perturbed
tuple of user ui, we have:
∀j ∈ [d], t∗i [Aj ] = ti[Aj ] + Lap
(
2d
ǫ
)
,
where Lap(λ) denotes a random variable that follows a
Laplace distribution of scale λ, with the following proba-
bility density function:
pdf(x) =
1
2λ
exp
(
−|x|
λ
)
.
Once the aggregator receives all perturbed tuples, it sim-
ply computes their average 1
n
∑n
i=1 t
∗
i [Aj ] as an estimate of
the mean of Aj . Clearly, this estimate is unbiased, since
the injected Laplace noise Lap
(
2d
ǫ
)
in each t∗i [Aj ] has zero
mean. Meanwhile, it is easy to calculate that the expected
error incurred by this estimator is O
(
d
ǫ
√
n
)
, which is linear
to the number of attributes d and, thus, could be excessively
large when there are many attributes. Note that this is a
fundamental problem that also exists in the traditional dif-
ferential privacy setting, when publishing statistics for mul-
tiple independent attributes. Perhaps rather surprisingly,
this problem has not received much attention in the differ-
ential privacy literature; the first and only solution we are
aware of is proposed by Duchi et al. [6, 7] under the local
differential privacy setting, presented below.
Duchi et al.’s method. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-
code of Duchi et al.’s method. The authors claim that this
method satisfies ǫ-local differential privacy, yields unbiased
estimates for the mean value of each attribute, and incurs
O
(√
d log d/(ǫ
√
n)
)
expected error for each attribute, which
is proven to be asymptotically optimal. As we explain later,
all three claims are incorrect, i.e., their method can violate
differential privacy, lead to a biased estimate and incur a
much higher amount of error. It takes as input the exact
tuple ti ∈ [−1, 1]d of user ui and a privacy parameter ǫ, and
outputs a perturbed vector t∗i ∈ {−B,B}d, where B is a
constant decided by d and ǫ. Note that the output is binary
for each attribute, i.e., it is either B or −B. Therefore,
it suffices for each user to transmit only one bit for each
attribute to the aggregator.
Upon receiving the perturbed tuples, the aggregator sim-
ply computes the average value for each attribute over all
users, and outputs these averages as the estimates of the
mean values for their corresponding attributes. Next we fo-
cus on the calculation of B, which is rather complicated.
Essentially, B is a scaling factor to ensure that the expected
value of a perturbed attribute is the same as that of the
exact attribute value. First, we calculate:
Cd =
{
2d−1, if d is odd
2d−1 − 1
2
(
d
d/2
)
, otherwise
(1)
Then, B is calculated by:
B =


2d +Cd · (eǫ − 1)(
d−1
(d−1)/2
) · (eǫ − 1) , if d is odd
2d + Cd · (eǫ − 1)(
d−1
d/2
) · (eǫ − 1) , otherwise
(2)
Duchi et al. show that 1
n
∑n
i=1 t
∗
i [Aj ] is an unbiased estima-
tor of the mean of Aj , and
E
[
max
j∈[d]
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
t∗i [Aj ]− 1
n
n∑
i=1
ti[Aj ]
∣∣∣∣∣
]
= O
(√
d log d
ǫ
√
n
)
,
(3)
Algorithm 1: Duchi et al.’s Method [6,7]
input : tuple ti ∈ [−1, 1]d and privacy parameter ǫ.
output: tuple t∗i ∈ {−B,B}
d.
1 Generate a random tuple v ∈ {−1, 1}d by sampling each
v[Aj ] independently from the following distribution:
Pr[v[Aj ] = x] =


1
2
+ 1
2
ti[Aj ], if x = 1
1
2
− 1
2
ti[Aj ], if x = −1
;
2 Let T+ (resp. T−) be the set of all tuples t∗ ∈ {−B,B}d
such that t∗ · v > 0 (resp. t∗ · v ≤ 0);
3 Sample a Bernoulli variable u that equals 1 with eǫ/(eǫ + 1)
probability;
4 if u = 1 then
5 return a tuple uniformly at random from T+;
6 else
7 return a tuple uniformly at random from T−;
which is asymptotically optimal [7].
Problems in Duchi et al.’s method and a possible
fix. We implemented and evaluated Duchi et al.’s method,
but found that whenever the number d of attribute is even,
the method yields a biased estimation of the mean of each
attribute and incurs significant error. Then, we also found
that it violates differential privacy when d is even. To il-
lustrate, consider that d = 2 and we have an input tuple
ti = 〈1, 1〉, i.e., ti[A1] = ti[A2] = 1. Then, Line 1 in Al-
gorithm 1 would generates a tuple v = 〈1, 1〉. Let B be as
defined in Equation (2), and T+ and T− be as defined in
Line 2 in Algorithm 1. It can be verified that T+ and T−
contain 1 and 3 tuples, respectively, with
T+ =
{ 〈B,B〉}, and
T− =
{ 〈−B,−B〉, 〈−B,B〉, 〈B,−B〉}.
Then, by Lines 3-8 in Algorithm 1, the method outputs
〈B,B〉 with eǫ
eǫ+1
probability. In contrast, each tuple in T−
has only 1
3eǫ+3
probability to be output.
Now consider another input tuple t′i = 〈−1,−1〉. It follows
that, for t′i, the algorithm outputs 〈B,B〉 with only 13eǫ+3
probability. As a consequence,
Pr[f(ti) =
〈
B,B〉] = 3eǫ · Pr [f(t′i) = 〈B,B〉]
> eǫ · Pr [f(t′i) = 〈B,B〉],
which indicates that the algorithm does not satisfy ǫ-
differential privacy.
We find that the above problem is caused by Line 3 in
Algorithm 1, in that the Bernoulli variable u is incorrectly
defined for the case for d is even. To address the problem,
one possible fix we found is to re-define u as a Bernoulli
variable such that
Pr[u = 1] =
eǫ · Cd
(eǫ − 1)Cd + 2d .
It can be shown that, with this revised choice of u, Algo-
rithm 1 achieves ǫ-differential privacy and ensures the error
bound in Equation 3. We omit the proofs for brevity.
Proposed method. In what follows, we present an algo-
rithm used in Harmony for perturbing a tuple that is concep-
tually simpler than Duchi et al.’s method, but achieves the
Algorithm 2: Proposed Method for Handling Numeric
Attributes
input : tuple ti ∈ [−1, 1]d and privacy parameter ǫ.
output: tuple t∗i ∈
{
− e
ǫ+1
eǫ−1d, 0,
eǫ+1
eǫ−1d
}d
.
1 Let t∗i = 〈0, 0, . . . , 0〉;
2 Sample j uniformly at random from [d];
3 Sample a Bernoulli variable u such that
Pr[u = 1] =
ti[Aj ] · (e
ǫ − 1) + eǫ + 1
2eǫ + 2
;
4 if u = 1 then
5 t∗[Aj ] = e
ǫ+1
eǫ−1 · d;
6 else
7 t∗[Aj ] = − e
ǫ+1
eǫ−1 · d;
8 return t∗i
same privacy assurance and asymptotic error bound. Fur-
thermore, our experiments (in Section 5) show that the al-
gorithm slightly outperforms Duchi et al.’s method in terms
of the empirical accuracy of the estimated means of numeric
attributes. Additionally, our method is more efficient: in
particular, each user only needs to transmit one bit to the
aggregator, which is clearly optimal. Our algorithm is in-
spired by an existing approach [2] for publishing categorical
data, which we will discuss in Section 3.2.
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code of our method. Given
a tuple ti ∈ [−1, 1]d, the algorithm returns a perturbed tuple
t∗i that has non-zero value on only one attribute Aj (j ∈ [d]).
Specifically, Aj is selected uniformly at random from all d
attributes of ti, and t
∗
i [Aj ] is sampled from the following
distribution:
Pr
[
t∗i [Aj ] = x
]
=


ti[Aj ]·(eǫ−1)+eǫ+1
2eǫ+2
, if x = e
ǫ+1
eǫ−1 · d
−ti[Aj ]·(eǫ−1)+eǫ+1
2eǫ+2
, if x = − eǫ+1
eǫ−1 · d
(4)
Observe that in the above method, the output t∗i contains
only one non-zero value, for the randomly chosen attribute
Aj . This value is binary; hence, the user ui only needs to
transmit 1 bit to the aggregator indicating its sign, and the
latter can re-scale it using parameters ǫ and d. Further, as
we show below the correctness of this method does not de-
pend on the choice of Aj as long as it is chosen uniformly at
random. Therefore, the value of j can be obtained, e.g., us-
ing a public source of random numbers such as a hash value
of the user’s ID. Therefore, the communication overhead be-
tween each user and the aggregator is exactly 1 bit.
The following lemmas establish the theoretical guarantees
of Algorithm 2.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 2 satisfies ǫ-local differential pri-
vacy.
Proof. Let t∗ be an output of Algorithm 2, and Aj be the
only attribute such that t∗[Aj ] 6= 0. Let t and t′ be any two
tuples, and u (resp. u′) be the Bernoulli variable generated
in Line 3 of Algorithm 2 given t (resp. t′) as the input. In
the following, we focus on the case when t∗[Aj ] = e
ǫ+1
eǫ−1d;
the case when t∗[Aj ] = − eǫ+1eǫ−1d can be analyzed in a similar
manner.
By Algorithm 2, we have
Pr[t∗ | t]
Pr[t∗ | t′] =
1/d · Pr[u = 1 | t]
1/d · Pr[u′ = 1 | t′] ≤
maxt Pr[u = 1 | t]
mint′ Pr[u′ = 1 | t′]
=
maxt[Aj ]∈[−1,1] (t[Aj ] · (eǫ − 1) + eǫ + 1)
mint′[Aj ]∈[−1,1] (t
′[Aj ] · (eǫ − 1) + eǫ + 1) = e
ǫ.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 2. Let t∗i be the output of Algorithm 2 given an
input tuple ti. Then, for any j ∈ [d], E[t∗[Aj ]] = t[Aj ].
Proof. By Equation (4),
E[t∗[Aj ]] =Pr
[
t∗[Aj ] = e
ǫ+1
eǫ−1 · d
]
· eǫ+1
eǫ−1 · d
+Pr
[
t∗[Aj ] = − eǫ+1eǫ−1 · d
]
·
(
− eǫ+1
eǫ−1 · d
)
+Pr [t∗[Aj ] = 0] · 0
=
2t[Aj ] · (eǫ − 1)
2eǫ − 2 = t[Aj ].
By Lemma 2, the server can use 1
n
∑n
i=1 t
∗[Aj ] as an un-
biased estimator of the mean of Aj . The following lemma
shows the accuracy guarantee of this estimator.
Lemma 3. For any j ∈ [d], let Z[Aj ] = 1n
∑n
i=1 t
∗
i [Aj ]
and X[Aj ] =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ti[Aj ]. With at least 1− β probability,
max
j∈[d]
∣∣Z[Aj ]−X[Aj ]∣∣ = O
(√
d log(d/β)
ǫ
√
n
)
.
Proof. First, observe that for any i ∈ [d] and any j ∈ [d],
the variance of t∗i [aj ]− ti[aj ] equals:
Var[t∗i [aj ]− ti[aj ]] = Var[t∗i [aj ]]
= E
[
(t∗i [aj ])
2]− (E[t∗i [aj ])2
= 1
d
(
eǫ+1
eǫ−1 · d
)2
− (ti[aj ])2 ≤
(
eǫ+1
eǫ−1
)2
· d.
By Bernstein’s inequality,
Pr
[|Z[aj ]−X[aj ]| ≥ λ]
≤ 2 · exp
(
− nλ
2
2
n
∑n
i=1Var[t
∗
i [aj ]− ti[aj ]] + 23λ · e
ǫ+1
eǫ−1 · 2d
)
= 2 · exp
(
− nλ
2
2d · (O(1/ǫ2) + λ ·O(1/ǫ))
)
.
By the union bound, there exists λ = O
(√
d log(d/β)
ǫ
√
n
)
such
that maxj∈[d] |Z[aj ] −X[aj ]| < λ holds with at least 1 − β
probability.
3.2 Estimating Frequencies for Categorical
Attributes
We now focus on the case where each user’s data record
contains not only numeric attributes but also categorical
ones. For each categorical attribute, the aggregator aims to
build an accurate histogram containing the frequency esti-
mate for each possible value in the attribute’s domain. For
example, Samsung may want to know the percentage of users
who enable a specific setting, through the diagnostic infor-
mation report app described in Section 1.1. Note that we can
Algorithm 3: Bassily and Smith’s method [2]
input : ti[Aj ] ∈ [k] for each user ui, privacy budget ǫ,
confidence of the error bound β
output: Frequency estimate for each of the k values in
attribute Aj
1 Compute γ =
√
log(2k/β)
ǫ2n
and m =
log(k+1) log(2/β)
γ2
;
2 Generate random matrix Φ ∈ {± 1√
m
}m×k;
3 for i = 1 to n do
4 User ui: draw s ∼ Uniform({1, 2 . . . , m});
5 User ui: draw t ∼ Bern(
eǫ
eǫ+1
);
6 User ui: if t = 1 then α = cǫmΦ[s, ti[Aj ]] else
α = −cǫmΦ[s, ti[Aj ]], where cǫ =
eǫ+1
eǫ−1 ;
7 User ui: submit 〈s, α〉, which represents a k-dimensional
vector zi where the s-th entry is α and the other entries
are 0;
8 Compute z¯ = 1
n
∑n
i=1 zi;
9 for l = 1 to k do
10 Estimate the frequency of the l-th value by the inner
product of the l-th column of Φ and z¯;
11 return k frequency estimates obtained above;
convert a numeric attribute a categorical one (e.g., display
brightness can be discretized to three levels: low, medium
and high) and build a histogram accordingly.
Randomized response for binary attributes. For a
single binary attribute (e.g., WiFi on/off), it suffices to use
the classic randomized response method [20] (also used in
Rappor [11]) to estimate the distribution of users. Specifi-
cally, suppose that the domain of the binary attribute (let
Aj) contains two possible values, −1 and +1. Each user ui
reports her true answer ti[Aj ] with probability p, and a ran-
dom answer with probability 1− p. The latter has the same
probability to be −1 and +1; hence, its expected value is
zero. Therefore, the expected value for ui’s reported value
is p · ti[Aj ]; thus, we can obtain an unbiased estimate by
multiplying the reported value by a scaling factor cǫ = 1/p.
Meanwhile, comparing ui’s true attribute value and
her reported one, the two are the same with probabil-
ity p+ (1− p)/2, and they are different with probability
(1 − p)/2. According to Definition 1, ǫ-local differential
privacy requires that p+(1−p)/2
(1−p)/2 ≤ eǫ. The equality holds
when p = e
ǫ−1
eǫ+1
. We thus arrive at the following unbi-
ased mechanism that satisfies ǫ-LDP: each user ui reports
cǫ ·ti[Aj ] = eǫ+1eǫ−1 ·ti[Aj ] with probability p+(1−p)/2 = e
ǫ
eǫ+1
,
and −cǫ · ti[Aj ] otherwise (i.e., with probability 1eǫ+1 ).
Once the aggregator receives all reported values for at-
tribute Aj , it computes the average over all users, which is
an estimate of the mean value E[Aj ] for Aj . Since Aj can
be either +1 or −1, the percentage of users with +1 (resp.
−1) is 1+E[Aj ]
2
(resp.
1−E[Aj ]
2
).
Bassily and Smith’s method. The problem is more com-
plicated when the categorical attribute Aj contains k > 2
possible values. In this situation, the aggregator aims to
build a histogram that contains the estimated frequency for
each of the k possible values. The current state-of-the-art to
our knowledge is by Bassily and Smith [2], shown in Algo-
rithm 3, which is proven to satisfy ǫ-LDP and achieve an op-
timal asymptotical error bound. There are two main ideas
in this method. First, the authors assume that the num-
ber of possible values k in the categorical attribute is far
larger than the number of users n; hence, the method ap-
plies random projection to reduce the dimensionality from k
to m. The value of m is chosen carefully so as to obtain the
asymptotically optimal error bound. This step essentially
transforms the categorical attribute into m binary ones.
Specifically, the random projection is done with a m × k
matrix Φ in which each element is randomly set to either
+ 1√
m
or − 1√
m
with equal probability. This ensures that (i)
the inner product of any column in Φ with itself is 1 (which
is where the absolute value of each element 1√
m
comes from)
and (ii) the inner product of two different columns in Φ has
zero expected value, since the signs are randomly generated.
Each user ui’s attribute value ti[Aj ] is then transformed to
m binary values by taking the ti[Aj ]-th column in Φ.
The second idea is for each user to randomly pick one of
the converted m binary attributes, and report a randomized
response using the method described earlier. Note that the
randomized response needs to be scaled by a factor of m,
since each of the m binary attributes has probability 1/m
to be chosen. The aggregator collects the average for each
of the m binary attributes, which is stored as a vector z¯.
To obtain the frequency estimate of a particular attribute
value l, the method takes the inner product of z¯ and the
l-th column of Φ, which can be proven to yield an unbiased
frequency estimate for the l-th value in Aj . Meanwhile, the
frequency estimate is proven to be within O
(√
log(k/β)
ǫ
√
n
)
error with probability 1 − β [2], where β is an input to the
algorithm.
Proposed method for a single categorical attribute.
Harmony generally follows Bassily and Smith’s method to
estimate value frequencies for a categorical attribute. How-
ever, we found that although Bassily and Smith’s method
achieves optimal asymptotic accuracy, in practice its accu-
racy tends to be unstable, especially for relatively small cat-
egorical domains. The reason is that the random projection
matrix Φ introduces considerable noise; in particular, the in-
ner product of two different columns is often non-zero unless
k is very large, which is magnified by a large number of users
n. Hence, we propose an alternative solution that obtains
higher accuracy when k = o(n). In particular, instead of
generating random matrix Φ (size m× k where m = O(n)),
we construct a binary matrix of size k×k satisfying that any
two column vectors are always orthogonal. The construction
algorithm of this matrix can be found in the appendix.
Proposed method for multiple numeric and categor-
ical attributes. Bassily and Smith’s method is limited to
a single categorical attribute. To extend it to multiple cat-
egorical attributes, a straightforward approach is to apply
the method once for each attribute separately. In that case,
however, the privacy budget ǫ needs to be divided among all
attributes, so as to ensure ǫ-LDP as a whole. Without loss of
generality, assume that we have d categorical attributes, and
we assign ǫ/d budget to each of them. Then, the amount
of noise incurred by Bassily and Smith’s method on each
attribute is increased d times to O
(
d
√
log(d/β)
ǫ
√
n
)
, which is
unsatisfactory when d is large.
Another approach for extension is to (i) convert the d cate-
gorical attributes into a“composite”attribute whose domain
equals the Cartesian product of the individual attribute do-
mains, and then (ii) apply Bassily and Smith’s method on
the composite attribute. This, however, only allows us to
(accurately) derive the frequency each composite value (i.e.,
combination of values from all d individual attributes), but
does not provide quality estimation of the frequency of each
individual value. Note that these limitations are not specific
to Bassily and Smith’s method; to our knowledge, there is
no existing work (including Rappor) that are designed to
handle multiple categorical attributes, let alone a mixture
of numeric and categorical ones.
In Harmony, we use a simple and elegant solution to han-
dle multiple attributes: for each numerical attribute, the
aggregator estimates its mean value; for each categorical at-
tribute, the aggregator estimates its value frequencies. In
particular, given d attributes A1, A2, . . . , Ad, the solution
asks each user to perform the following:
1. Draw j uniformly at random from set {1, 2, . . . , d};
2. If Aj is a numeric attribute, then submit a noisy ver-
sion of t[Aj ] computed as in Lines 3-7 of Algorithm 2;
3. Otherwise (i.e., Aj is a categorical attribute), compute
〈s, α〉 as in Lines 4-8 of Algorithm 3, then submits
〈s, d · α〉 to represent a d-dimensional vector where the
s-th entry is d · α and all other entries are zero.
The above solution satisfies ǫ-LDP, which follows from
the fact that (i) each user randomly selects one attribute to
submit, and (ii) the algorithm used for submitting the se-
lected attribute is ǫ-differentially private. For each numeric
attribute, it is easy to see that the solution provides the
same accuracy guarantee as Algorithm 2, since both meth-
ods handle numeric attributes in exactly the same way. The
following lemma states the accuracy guarantee of our solu-
tion for categorical attributes.
Lemma 4. For each categorical attribute Aj with a do-
main {1, 2, . . . , k}, let xl be the frequency of the l-th value of
Aj, and yl be the estimation of xl returned by our solution.
With at least 1− β probability,
max
l∈[k]
∣∣yl − xl∣∣ = O
(√
d log(k/β)
ǫ
√
n
)
.
Proof (Sketch). Consider any user with a tuple t.
With respect to Aj , our solution can be regarded as a
method that (i) outputs nothing with d− 1/d probability,
and (ii) with the remaining 1/d probability, applies Bassily
and Smith’s algorithm on Aj and scale its output up by d
times. It follows that the variance of each of our frequency
estimators for Aj is d times that of Bassily and Smith’s es-
timator. Based on the analysis in [2], it can be shown that
the variance of Bassily and Smith’s estimator is O
(
1
nǫ2
)
.
Therefore, the variance of each of our frequency estima-
tors is O
(
d
nǫ2
)
. Combining this with Bernstein’s inequality
and the union bound, it can be proven that with at least
1 − β probability, the error in any k of our estimators is
O
(√
d log(k/β)
ǫ
√
n
)
.
By Lemma 4, when there exist multiple categorical at-
tributes, the error incurred by our approach is a factor of
O(
√
d) smaller than that of a solution that repeatedly apply
Bassily and Smith’s method on each categorical attribute.
4. BUILDING MACHINE LEARNING
MODELS USING STOCHASTIC GRA-
DIENT DESCENT
This section investigates building a large class of machine
learning models that can be expressed as empirical risk min-
imization under ǫ-local differential privacy. In particular, we
focus on three common types of learning tasks: linear regres-
sion, logistic regression, and SVM classification. Section 4.1
introduces the basic approaches for building these models,
while Section 4.2 discusses optimizations that lead to im-
proved results in practice.
4.1 Basic Methods
Suppose that each user ui has a pair 〈xi, yi〉, where
xi ∈ [−1, 1]d and yi ∈ [−1, 1] (for linear regression) or
yi ∈ {−1, 1} (for logistic regression and SVM classification).
Let ℓ(·) be a loss function that (i) maps a d-dimensional pa-
rameter vector β into a real number and (ii) is parameterized
by xi and yi. We aim to identify a parameter vector β
∗ such
that
β∗ = argmin
β
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
ℓ(β;xi, yi)
)
+
λ
2
‖β‖22,
where λ > 0 is a regularization parameter. We consider
three specific loss functions:
1. Linear regression: ℓ(β;xi, yi) = (x
T
i β − yi)2;
2. Logistic regression: ℓ(β;xi, yi) = log
(
1 + e−yix
T
i β
)
;
3. SVM (hinge loss): ℓ(β;xi, yi) = max{0, 1− yixTi β}.
For convenience, we define
ℓ′(β;xi, yi) = ℓ(β;xi, yi) +
λ
2
‖β‖22.
One of the most common solutions to compute β∗ is
stochastic gradient descent (SGD). It starts from an ini-
tial parameter vector β0, and iteratively updates it into
β1, β2, . . . based on the following equation:
βk+1 = βk − γk · ∇ℓ′(βk;x, y),
where 〈x, y〉 is the tuple of a randomly selected user,
∇ℓ′(βk;x, y) is the gradient of ℓ′ at βk, and γk is a constant
typically set to O(1/
√
k). It terminates when the difference
between βk+1 and βk is sufficiently small.
Under our problem setting, however, ∇ℓ′ is not directly
available to the aggregator, and needs to be collected in a
private manner. Towards this end, existing work [7,13] has
suggested that the aggregator may ask the selected user in
each iteration to submit a noisy version of ∇ℓ′, by using
the Laplace mechanism or Duchi et al.’s method (i.e., Algo-
rithm 1). We can straightforwardly improve these existing
approaches by perturbing ∇ℓ′ using Algorithm 2 instead;
however, we observe that such a solution is insufficient for
our target application, as we explain in Section 4.2.
4.2 Improvements
Mini-batching. We observe in our experiments that the
aforementioned SGD approach yields rather inaccurate re-
sults, due to the noise injected in the gradient ∇ℓ′ returned
by each user. In particular, if each user applies Algo-
rithm 2 to compute ∇ℓ′(βk;x, y), the amount of noise in
∇ℓ′ is O
(√
d log d
ǫ
)
, which is excessively large given that
x ∈ [−1, 1]d. To address this issue, we adopt mini-batch
gradient descent instead of SGD. That is, each iteration of
the algorithm, we involve a group G of users, and ask each of
them to submit a noisy version of the gradient; after that,
we update the parameter vector βk with the mean of the
noisy gradients, i.e.,
βk+1 = βk − γk · 1|G|
∑|G|
i=1∇ℓ∗i ,
where ∇ℓ∗i is the noisy gradient submitted by the i-th user
in G. This helps because the amount of noise in the average
gradient is O
(√
d log d
ǫ
√
|G|
)
, which could be acceptable if |G| =
Ω
(
d log d/ǫ2
)
.
However, when d is sizable, |G| = Ω (d log d/ǫ2) is large.
As a consequence, when we allow each user to participate
in at most one iteration of the algorithm, the maximum
number of iterations (i.e., n/|G|) is small. In that case, the
algorithm may terminate prematurely and return an infe-
rior parameter vector. One may attempt to mitigate this
problem by allowing each user to be involved in m > 1 it-
erations, but it would further increase the amount of noise
in each gradient returned. To explain this, suppose that
the i-th (i ∈ [1,m]) gradient returned by the user satisfies
ǫi-differential privacy. By the composition property of differ-
ential privacy [17], if we are to enforce ǫ-differential privacy
for the user’s data, we should have
∑m
i=1 ǫi ≤ ǫ. Consider
that we set ǫi = ǫ/m. Then, the amount of noise in each
gradient becomes O
(
m
√
d log d
ǫ
)
; accordingly, the acceptable
mini-batch size becomes |G| = Ω (m2d log d/ǫ2), which is
m2 times the acceptable size when we allow each user to
participate in at most one iteration. It then follows that
the total number of iterations in the algorithm is inversely
proportional to 1/m, i.e., setting m > 1 only degrades the
performance of the algorithm.
Dimension reduction. For linear regression, instead of
increasing m, we propose to apply dimensionality reduction
on each user’s data, so as to reach an acceptable size of mini-
batches. Specifically, the curator first generates a random
r × d matrix P where r < d and each entry has an equal
probability to be assigned 1/d or −1/d. Then, the curator
shares P with all users, and asks each user to convert her
tuple 〈xi, yi〉 into a reduced tuple 〈x′i, yi〉, where x′i = Px.
In other words, we project {xi} into a random r-dimensional
sub-space, and such a projection is known to preserve several
important characteristics of the original data [1]. It can be
verified that x′i ∈ [−1, 1]r .
Subsequently, each user uses the reduced tuple 〈x′i, yi〉 to
participate in the mini-batch gradient descent algorithm.
In other words, each noisy gradient ∇ℓ∗i returned by the
user is r-dimensional instead of d-dimensional. As such,
the average noisy gradient obtained from a mini-batch G of
users has an error of O
(√
r log r
ǫ
√
|G|
)
instead of O
(√
d log d
ǫ
√
|G|
)
.
Accordingly, the acceptable mini-batch size is reduced to
|G| = Ω (r log r/ǫ2).
Algorithm 4 shows the pseudo-code of our mini-batch gra-
dient descent method with dimension reduction, in the con-
Algorithm 4: An Iterative Method for Empirical Risk
Minimization
input : positive integer r, mini-batch size g, privacy
parameter ǫ
output: parameter vector α ∈ Rr
1 generates a random r × d matrix P each entry has an equal
probability to 1/d or −1/d;
2 initialize a counter k = 0, and learning rate γ;
3 initialize a r-dimensional vector ∇ = 〈0, 0, . . . , 0〉;
4 while true do
5 if a user with a tuple 〈xi, yi〉 comes online then
6 send P to the user;
7 the user computes x′i = Pxi, and derives
∇i = ∇ℓ′(α; x′i, yj);
8 if ∇i /∈ [−1, 1]r then
9 the user projects ∇i onto [−1, 1]
r;
10 the user applies Algorithm 2 on ∇i, and submits a
noisy gradient ∇∗i ;
11 k = k + 1, and ∇ = ∇+∇∗i ;
12 if k mod g = 0 then
13 ∇ = ∇
g
, and γ = 1/
√
k/g;
14 α = α− γ · ∇;
15 if k is sufficiently large or α changes sufficiently
small in the last update then
16 break;
17 return α;
text of the Samsung diagnostic tool. The aggregator first
generates a random r × d matrix P , and maintains a r-
dimensional parameter vector α (Lines 1-3). (We use α
instead of β to denote the parameter vector to avoid con-
fusion on its dimensionality.) After that, whenever a user
with a tuple 〈xi, yi〉 comes online, she obtains P and the
current α from the aggregator (Line 6). Then, the user
computes a reduced tuple 〈x′i, yi〉, as well as the gradient
∇i = ∇ℓ′(α;x′i, yj) (Line 7). If any entry of ∇i is larger than
1 (resp. smaller than −1), then the user resets the entry to
1 (resp. −1) (Lines 8-9). This ensures that ∇i ∈ [−1, 1]d,
so that it can be a valid input to Algorithm 2. After that,
the user computes a noisy gradient ∇∗i using Algorithm 2,
submits it to the aggregator, and then logs off (Line 10).
The aggregator computes the average noisy gradient from
every g users (where g is an input parameter), and updates
the parameter vector α accordingly (Lines 11-14). When
the update to α is sufficiently small or when a sufficiently
large number of users have participated, the aggregator ter-
minates the algorithm (Lines 15-16).
5. EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Experimental Settings
For experimental repeatability, we use two public datasets
extracted from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
[14], US and BR, which contains census records from the
United States and Brazil, respectively. US contains 9M tu-
ples and 23 attributes, among which 6 are numeric (e.g., age)
and 17 are categorical (e.g., gender); BR has 4M records and
18 attributes, among which 6 are numeric and 12 are cat-
egorical. Both datasets contain a numeric attribute “total
income”, which we use as the dependent attribute in linear
regression, logistic regression, and SVM. We normalize the
domain of each numeric attribute into [−1, 1].
5.2 Estimating Means and Frequencies
In the first set of experiments, we consider the task of col-
lecting a noisy tuple from each user to estimate the mean of
each numeric attribute and the frequency of each categorical
value. As mentioned in Section 1, none of the existing solu-
tions can directly support this task, since they are designed
for either numeric or categorical attributes, but not both.
To address this issue, we construct a method (referred to as
Hybrid) by combining the best existing solutions as follows.
Let t be a tuple with dn numeric attributes and dc cate-
gorical attributes. Given t and a privacy budget ǫ, Hybrid
first constructs a dn-dimensional tuple t
′ that contains all
numeric values in t, and then release a noisy version of t′ by
invoking Duchi et al.’s method (see Section 3.1) on t′, using
a privacy budget of dnǫ/d. After that, for each categori-
cal value in t, Hybrid applies Bassily and Smith’s method
(see Section 3.2) to release a noisy version with a privacy
budget of ǫ/d. By the composition property of differential
privacy [17], Hybrid ensures ǫ-LDP. Intuitively, Hybrid is a
best-effort approach to incorporate two states of the art that
are designed only for numeric attributes (i.e., Duchi et al.’s
method) and a single categorical attribute (i.e., Bassily and
Smith’s method), respectively.
We apply our solution in Section 3 and Hybrid on both
US and BR to generate noisy tuples, and then use the noisy
tuples to estimate the frequency of each value in each cate-
gorical domain in US and BR. For each method, we measure
the L∞ error in the estimated value frequencies, and we take
the average measurement from 100 runs. Figures 1a and 1b
illustrate the results as ǫ varies. Observe that our method
is significantly more accurate than Hybrid in all cases, and
its error is only around 1/4 of the error incurred by Hy-
brid. This is consistent with the analysis in Section 3.2 that
(i) our method has O
(√
d log k
ǫ
√
n
)
estimation error, and (ii)
repeatedly applying Bassily and Smith’s method on each
categorical leads to O
(
d
√
log k
ǫ
√
n
)
error.
We also use the noisy tuples to estimate the mean of each
numeric attribute, and we measure the L∞ error of each
method, averaged over 100 runs. Figure 1c (resp. 1d) shows
the results on US (resp. BR) as a function of the privacy
budget ǫ. Observe that our solution slightly outperforms
Hybrid, regardless of the dataset used and the value of ǫ. We
also note that, compared with Hybrid (which applies Duchi
et al.’s method to handle numeric attributes), our solution
has a much lower communication cost on each user (since
it only requires each user to transfer 1 bit), and is much
simpler.
5.3 Empirical Risk Minimization
In the second set of experiments, we consider linear re-
gression, logistic regression, and SVM classification on US
and BR. For both datasets, we use the numeric attribute
“total income” as the dependent variable, and all other at-
tributes as independent variables. Following the standard
practice, we transform each categorical attribute Aj with k
values into k − 1 binary attributes with a domain {−1, 1},
such that (i) the l-th (l < k) value in Aj is represented by
a 1 on the l-th binary attribute and a −1 on each of the
remaining k − 2 attributes, and (ii) the k-th value in Aj is
represented by −1 on all binary attributes. After this trans-
formation, the dimensionality of US (resp. BR) becomes 85
(resp. 95). For logistic regression and SVM (which requires
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Figure 1: Experiments on estimating means and frequencies.
Private SGD Private MGD Private MGD-DR Non-Private
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8
10−1
101
103
105
107
privacy budget ǫ
M
S
E
(a) US - Linear
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
privacy budget ǫ
m
is
cl
a
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
ra
te
(b) US - Logistic
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
privacy budget ǫ
m
is
cl
a
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
ra
te
(c) US - SVM
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8
10−1
101
103
105
107
privacy budget ǫ
M
S
E
(d) BR - Linear
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
privacy budget ǫ
m
is
cl
a
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
ra
te
(e) BR - Logistic
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
privacy budget ǫ
m
is
cl
a
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
ra
te
(f) BR - SVM
Figure 2: Experimental results for empirical risk minimization.
the dependent variable to be binary), we convert “total in-
come” into a binary attribute by mapping all values which
are greater than or equal to the mean to 1, and all other
values to −1.
We evaluate four methods: (i) a private version of SGD
that involves one user in each iteration, and asks the user
to submit a noisy gradient using Duchi et al.’s method;
(ii) mini-batch gradient descent (MGD), which involves g
users in each iteration, and uses the average noisy gradi-
ents of those users (generated with Algorithm 2) to up-
date the parameter vector; (iii) MGD with dimension re-
duction (DR), which is an improved version of MGD that
projects the users’ data onto an r-dimensional sub-space be-
fore the learning task (this method is applied for linear re-
gression only); (iv) a non-private version of SGD. Based
on the analysis in Section 4, we set the mini-batch size
for MGD and MGD-DR to g = max{2d log d/ǫ2, n/1000}
and g = max{2r log r/ǫ2, n/1000}, respectively. The term
n/1000 is to guarantee that our mini-batch size is not too
small when ǫ is large. In addition, we set r = 20. For all
methods, we set the regularization factor λ = 10−4.
On each dataset, we use 10-fold cross validation to assess
the performance of each method. Figure 2a (resp. 2d) shows
the mean squared error (MSE) of the linear regression model
generated by each method, under various values of ǫ. Private
SGD incurs prohibitive errors in all cases, due to the large
amount of noise in the gradient that it obtains in each itera-
tion. MGD alleviates this issue with mini-batches, but still
provides unsatisfactory accuracy for linear regression. The
reason, as we mentioned in Section 4.2, is that MGD requires
using a large mini-batch size g when d is large, which in turn
leads to a small total number of iterations and degrades its
performance. MGD-DR overcomes the drawback of MGD
by incorporating dimension reduction to reduce the required
mini-batch size, and hence, it is able to achieve an accuracy
that is close to the non-private SGD.
Figures 2b and 2e (2c and 2f) illustrate the misclassifica-
tion rate of each method for logistic regression (resp. SVM).
Overall, our experimental results demonstrate the effective-
ness of mini-batches and dimension reduction for empirical
risk minimization under local differential privacy.
6. RELATED WORK
Differential privacy [4, 8, 9] is a strong, mathematically
rigorous framework for privacy protection. Unlike ear-
lier privacy-preserving data publication methods which are
largely syntactic, differential privacy provides semantic,
information-theoretic guarantees on individuals’ privacy.
Hence, since its proposal in 2003 it had attracted much
attention from various research communities in computer
science, including theory [10], machine learning [18], data
management [21], and systems [19].
Earlier models of differential privacy assume a trusted
data curator, who collects and manages the exact private
information of individuals, and releases statistics derived
from the data under differential privacy requirements. In
practice, however, users may not want to share private in-
formation with anyone, including the central data curator.
Recently, much attention has been shifted to the local dif-
ferential privacy model, which eliminates the data curator
and the collection of exact private information. Specifically,
Duchi et al. [5] systematically investigate the concept of lo-
cal differential privacy, propose the minimax framework for
LDP based on the information theory, prove upper and lower
error bounds of LDP-compliant methods, and analyze the
trade-off between privacy and accuracy. Kairouz et al. [15]
show that a version of randomized response is an optimal
mechanism for frequency estimation on a single binary at-
tribute. Kairouz et al. [16] study the problem with a categor-
ical attribute with an arbitrary number of possible values,
propose two mechanisms: binary and randomized response
mechanisms, and prove their optimality when the privacy
budget is low and high, respectively. Bassily and Smith [2]
propose an asymptotically optimal solution for building suc-
cinct histograms over a large categorical domain under LDP.
Erlingsson et al. [11] propose the RAPPOR framework,
which is based on the randomized response mechanism for
publishing a vector of binary values under LDP. They use
this mechanism with a Bloom filter, which intuitively adds
another level of protection and increases the difficulty for
the adversary to infer private information. As a result, it
also becomes more difficult derive statistics from the col-
lected data, and they propose a sophisticated solution for
this purpose. A follow-up paper [12] extends Rappor to
more complex statistics such as joint distributions and asso-
ciation testing, as well as categorical attributes that contain
a large number of potential values, such as a user’s home
page.
7. CONCLUSION
This work systematically investigates the problem of col-
lecting and analyzing users’ personal data under ǫ-local dif-
ferential privacy, in which the aggregator only collects ran-
domized data from the users, and computes statistics based
on such data. The proposed solution Harmony is able to col-
lect data records that contain multiple numeric and categor-
ical attributes, and compute accurate statistics from simple
ones such as mean and frequency to complex machine learn-
ing models such as linear regression, logistic regression and
SVM classification. Harmony achieves both optimal asymp-
totic error bound and high accuracy in practice. Meanwhile,
it is highly efficient in terms of communication and compu-
tational overhead. Extensive experiments demonstrate its
effectiveness on real data. In the next step, we plan to in-
vestigate the application of Harmony in a real use case such
as Samsung’s diagnostic info report app.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 5. The set S returned from Algorithm 5 is an
orthogonal set.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction. For the base
case, observe that the initial value of S = {[1,−1], [1, 1]}
is a orthogonal set. Now assume that S = {vi} is a or-
thogonal set. We will prove that S′ = {vi||vi, vi||(−vi)} is
also orthogonal set. For any v′′, v′ ∈ S′, consider the dot
product 〈v′′, v′〉, there are two general cases: (i) 〈v′′, v′〉 =
〈vi|| ± vi, vj || ± vj〉 and (ii) 〈v′′, v′〉 = 〈vi||vi, vi|| − vi〉. In
both cases, the inner product equals zero. Thus, lemma is
proved.
